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LEGAL STABILITY CONTRACTS IN COLOMBIA:
AN APPROPRIATE INCENTIVE
FOR INVESTMENTS?
Historical Causes and Impact Analysis of Law 963 of 2005
A´lvaro Pereira*
ABSTRACT
Current global economic order is openly dependent on foreign direct
investment (FDI). At least since the 1990’s, developing countries have
competed to attract FDI because it is considered the best source of
technology, employment, and financial resources. Colombian Law 963
of 2005, which is a response to said competition, allows the signature
of Legal Stability Contracts (LSCs) between the State and investors
for the purpose of stabilizing the rules guiding investment decisions,
for up to 20 years. Legal stabilization has successfully proven to in-
crease FDI inflows. Nevertheless, incentives for FDI have been subject
to several critiques that stress the excess of benefits for foreign inves-
tors in exchange for weak commitments.
Wanting to examine the suitability of Law 963 in attracting FDI to
Colombia and in increasing its positive impact, I studied the “state of
art” of FDI and legal stabilization, the historical causes of incentives in
Colombia, and the LSCs signed in the light of said Law. The results of
my study reveal that the law successfully met the expectations of in-
creasing investments. However, there is also evidence that early re-
forms and a deficient application of the law prevented it from
increasing the positive social impact of investments.
Key words: Legal Stability Contracts, Foreign Direct Investment, In-
vestment Incentives, Stabilization Clauses, Colombia, Latin America.
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INTRODUCTION
On July 8, 2005, the Congress of Colombia approved Law 963,
which created Legal Stability Contracts (“LSCs”). The purpose of LSCs
is to attract foreign and local investments1 by having the State commit
to stabilize rules that were determinant for the investment decision for
up to twenty years.2 Investors, in turn, are required to invest a mini-
mum of approximately USD $1.5 million and to comply with other
specifications related to the type of project and their economic and so-
cial impact.3
LSCs are part of a wider national policy aimed at attracting
foreign direct investment (“FDI”).4 FDI is important due to its genera-
tion, inter alia, of technology, employment, and financial resources.5
Consequently, less industrialized countries can acquire amounts and
qualities of assets that would otherwise be impossible to achieve with-
out FDI.6 This also explains the fierce competition between states for
FDI, which is described as “both intense and widespread.”7
Colombia began the 21st century with major social and eco-
nomic challenges, some of which could be resolved with FDI’s contribu-
tions. These challenges, such as the country’s internal armed conflict
and legal instability, were a few of the main forces preventing an in-
crease in foreign investments.8 After other states in the region suc-
cessfully implemented incentives, the Colombian government quickly
encouraged LSCs with the purpose of raising FDI inflows despite the
nation’s deficiencies.
Law 963 of 2005 has been subject to critiques since it entered
into force. It is often condemned for, among other things, violation of
competition standards, for restricting legislators’ constitutional pow-
1 Juliana Castan˜o & Paola Galeano, Los Contratos de Estabilidad Jurı´dica en Co-
lombia: ¿Una verdadera Herramienta Para la Proteccio´n de los Intereses del Inver-
sionista Extranjero y del Estado Colombiano?, 2 EAFIT J. OF INT’L L. 68, 69 (2011).
2 L. 963, julio 8, 2005, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] art. 6 (Colom.).
3 Id. art. 2; MINISTERIO DE COMERCIO, INDUSTRIA Y TURISMO, 1 GUI´A LEGAL PARA
HACER NEGOCIOS EN COLOMBIA, no. 3, Jun. 2011, at 13.
4 Castan˜o, supra note 1, at 69.
5 See Robert E. Lipsey, Foreign Direct Investment and the Operations of Multina-
tional Firms: Concepts, History, and Data 8-9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 8665, 2001).
6 See Gordon Hanson, Should Countries Promote Foreign Direct Investment? 11
(U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., G-24 Discussion Paper Series No.9, Feb. 2001).
7 CHARLES OMAN, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT,
POLICY COMPETITION FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 77 (2000), available at
http://www.oecd.org/mena/investment/35275189.pdf.
8 See CONSEJO NACIONAL DE POL. ECON. Y SOCIAL, CONSIDERACIONES TE´CNICAS
PARA LA EVALUACIO´N DE SOLICITUDES DE CELEBRACIO´N DE CONTRATOS DE ES-
TABILIDAD JURI´DICA 1 (Documento Conpes, No. 3366, Aug. 1, 2005).
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ers, and for long-term stabilizations that do not guarantee a signifi-
cant impact. Incentives for FDI, particularly the ones contemplating
legal stability, are per se controversial because they enlarge investors’
powers and require major sacrifices by host economies.9
The main purpose of my study was to evaluate whether Law
963 effectively addresses its own purposes (increasing investments
and their social impact) and to identify the causes of possible flaws.
Results will also contribute to the discussions on the suitability of in-
centives for FDI and of agreements for stabilization.
My research integrates three types of analysis to accomplish
this purpose. The first form of analysis consists of a review of litera-
ture on FDI and development, and of both Colombian and Latin Amer-
ican economic history. The aim is to identify general and specific
causes behind investment incentives in Colombia and the region. The
second method of analysis concerns the study of all available signed
contracts. I studied the sixty-four LSCs that were signed as of Septem-
ber of 2010 with the intent of evaluating the impact of the law and the
ways it has been applied. I chose these particular contracts because
they are publicly accessible. However, the number of signed contracts
has not significantly increased since then (68 as of December of 2012),
which validates the results and the inferences based on them. The last
group of resources consists of two interviews with key players in the
negotiation of LSCs, with the purpose of identifying patterns in the
application of the law and perceptions of the reforms.
Hence, the first section of the text briefly introduces FDI and
why it is increasingly important in both the global and the Colombian
economy. The second and third sections, respectively, explain the role
of FDI within Colombia during the 20th and 21st centuries, with par-
ticular emphasis on the policies that affected it, since that history was
the basis for current incentives. The fourth section introduces the rela-
tion between legal stability and investment, and concludes with a com-
parative analysis of the different instruments that address it. Section
five presents Law 963 of 2005 and all relevant information related to
the establishment of LSCs, while the sixth and seventh segments ex-
amine results and conclusions.
9 The biggest controversy arises from the confrontation between developing coun-
tries in need of capital and investors’ interests in profitability, a relation in which
evidence shows the host States to be weaker. Recent studies have found that alter-
natives like strengthening negotiation skills and capacity, and pressure on mul-
tinational corporations to comply with environmental and social standards can
significantly improve the negotiation of stabilization clauses in favor of the host
economy. See U.N. Secretary-General, Promotion And Protection Of All Human
Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social And Cultural Rights, Including The
Right To Development, § 41, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008), available at http:/
/www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf.
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I. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
Foreign Direct Investment is the transfer of assets from one
country to another “for the purpose of their use in that country to gen-
erate wealth under the total or partial control of the owner of the as-
sets.”10 Investors who own 10 percent or more of the equity stake,
ordinary shares, or voting power of a company, are generally consid-
ered to have control or management authority.11 Emphasizing this
control is not anecdotic because it reflects “lasting interest,” which is a
positive element of FDI that refers to the host country’s aptitude for
permanency.12 This characteristic also differentiates it from other
types of foreign investments, such as portfolios, in which the interest is
solely on a future return like dividends or capital.13
FDI is noteworthy because, by definition, it is expected to gen-
erate wealth in the receiving country. It is not restricted to the trans-
fer of financial resources, but is considered a source of technology,
know-how, employment, and generally everything needed to make the
investment profitable.14 All of these in turn are considered to have
positive social impact.15
FDI’s increasing importance to the world’s economy,16 espe-
cially for developing countries,17 might be related to that positive so-
cial impact. As Jensen explains, the lasting interest inherent in FDI
suggests a long-term relation with the host country, which maximizes
its benefits and its impact in economic growth and development.18
The participation of transnational corporations (“TNCs”) could
be another cause for the proliferation of FDI. These enterprises, also
known as multinational corporations, have operations in different
10 See MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT 8 (3d ed. 2004).
11 United Nations Conference on Trade & Development [UNCTAD], WORLD IN-
VESTMENT REPORT 2012 – METHODOLOGICAL NOTE 3 (2012), available at http://
unctad.org/en/PublicationChapters/WIR2012MethodologicalNote_en.pdf.
12 See SORNARAJAH, supra note 10, at 8 n.19.
13 IMAD A. MOOSA, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE
1 (2002).
14 See Lipsey, supra note 5, at 8-9.
15 Contra Hanson, supra note 6, at 13 (“This interpretation, however, is subject to
the same concerns about omitted variables and endogeneity bias. . .”).
16 According to 2011 World Investment Report, FDI represents 5% or more of the
GDP in most countries. See UNCTAD, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT - NON-EQ-
UITY MODES OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 2-38 (2011) [here-
inafter WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT]; see also infra p. 11, Chart 1.
17 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 16, at 21.
18 NATHAN M. JENSEN, NATION-STATES AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION 32-
39 (2006).
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countries,19 a particularity that has changed the traditional notion of
FDI, which was composed primarily of firms.20 Their dominant posi-
tion in FDI flows worldwide is so apparent that recent studies have
found FDI “in virtually every nation in the world.”21 It is common for
governments to seek to attract TNC investments and to give these en-
terprises wide negotiation powers because TNCs typically are leaders
in innovation and have millions of dollars in resources.22
According to contemporary economic theory, FDI is the most
effective engine for development when compared to previous alterna-
tives such as aid or credit.23 The main reason is that it is a good source
of financial resources,24 new jobs,25 and technology,26 all of which are
linked to improving export competitiveness.27
Nevertheless, there is an increasing contention that FDI has
an uncertain impact on development.28 One line of argument asserts
that for FDI to have a positive impact it is necessary to direct FDI
through policy. Alternatives like promoting FDI for specific sectors29
19 See S. Lall & P. Streeten, TNCs and Welfare of Host Countries: Analytical Con-
siderations, in U.N. LIB. ON TRANSNAT’L CORP., TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 43, 43-45 (Sanjaya Lall ed., 1993).
20 See FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 2-3
(Steven Brakman & Harry Garretsen, eds., 2008).
21 See JENSEN, supra note 18, at 1; see also UNCTAD, supra note 11.
22 See JENSEN, supra note 18, at 32-33.
23 Economic theory highlights that, compared to other forms of finance, FDI has
certain advantages. These advantages include providing capital inflows that may
exceed the domestic savings capacity of least developed countries, and the apti-
tude to do so without submitting to fixed interests. See Hanson, supra note 6, at
10-11.
24 Id. Financial resources are also crucial to economic growth since they have a
direct effect on production capacity. See Eliana Cardoso & Rudiger Dornbusch.
Foreign Private Capital Flows, in 2 HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1388,
1388 (H. Chenery & T.N. Srinivasan eds., 1989).
25 See David Greenway & Holger Go¨rg, Much Ado About Nothing? Do Domestic
Firms Really Benefit from Foreign Direct Investment?, 19 WORLD BANK RESEARCH
OBSERVER 171, 174 (2003) (discussing how FDI not only increases employment
rates, but improves the skills and capabilities of workers).
26 See Katherin Marton, Technology Transfer to Developing Countries via Mul-
tinationals, 9 THE WORLD ECON. 409, 409 (1986).
27 See THEODORE H. MORAN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 20
(1998).
28 See Helen V Milner & Tim Bu¨the. The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into
Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements?,
52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 741, 741 (2008).
29 See Diana Bozhilova. When Foreign Direct Investment is Good for Development:
Bulgaria’s Accession, Industrial Restructuring and Regional FDI 6-9 (The Hellenic
Observatory, The Euro. Inst., GreeSE Working Paper No. 33, Apr. 2010), available
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and improving human resources30 have increased capabilities to ab-
sorb FDI benefits. Although complementary, incentives have also con-
tributed to increasing FDI inflows in a variety of economies.31
Another series of more critical studies argue that FDI is not an
engine for development, but a source of economic crisis.32 An even
more radical position holds that FDI is a strategy for developed coun-
tries to control the resources and markets of developing nations.33
Regardless of these critiques, development projects have trans-
formed since the mid-1980s from aid or credits to the promotion of
market-oriented legal reforms in which FDI is essential.34 The idea
that it was necessary to transform protectionist economies into market
economies to allow the flow of technologies and capital, and to eventu-
ally increase savings to comply with past credits, advanced these legal
reforms.35 The evident failure of closed economies in Latin America
and the former Soviet Union, compared to the success of open ones in
southeastern Asia and in emergent economies like Chile, reaffirms
that idea.
In this new strategy, FDI is both desirable and necessary for
developing countries in that it represents new capital, technology, and
employment that would otherwise be unachievable. The results are de-
at http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/
GreeSE/GreeSE33.pdf.
30 See DIRK WILLEM TE VELDE, OVERSEAS DEV. INST., FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
AND DEVELOPMENT - AN HISTORICAL PROSPECTIVE 2 (2006), available at http://
www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/850.
pdf.).
31 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 16, at 97, Box III.2 (referring to the
Report on Non-Equity Modes).
32 See David Woodward, Financial Effects of Foreign Direct Investment in the Con-
text of a Possible WTO Agreement on Investment 19 (Third World Network Trade &
Dev. Ser. No. 21, 2003) (“FDI flows may be seen as equivalent to borrowing at an
interest rate of 16-18% p.a. for developing countries as a whole, and 24-30% in
sub-Saharan Africa, so that net outward resource transfers can only be avoided by
allowing inward FDI stocks to grow at this rate. This implies a rapid expansion
relative to the ability to meet the foreign exchange costs.”).
33 Tandom explains that profitability crisis is inherent to the capitalist system
and responds to the tension between labor and capital. To counter these effects,
one might lower worker wages and deny their demands, or export capital to reduce
production costs. See Yash Tandon. What is Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)?, SEA-
TINI (Sept. 2004), http://www.seatini.org/publications/factsheets/fdishort.htm.
34 Ashoka Mody, Is FDI Integrating the World Economy?, 27 THE WORLD
ECON. 1195, 1195 (2004); Andrew Sumner, Is Foreign Direct Investment Good for
the Poor? A Review and Stocktake, 15 DEV. IN PRACTICE no. 3/4, June 2005, at 269,
269.
35 JORGE REINEL PULECIO, LA APERTURA EN COLOMBIA, COSTOS Y RIESGOS DE LA
POLI´TICA ECONO´MICA 19-20 (1991).
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cisive: FDI has increased even after the 2009 global economic crisis. It
currently represents at least 5 percent of the GDP in more than half of
the countries in the world, and at least 50 percent of the GDP in an
increasing number of states.36 In 2010, developing economies absorbed
close to half of global FDI inflows.37
CHART 1. FDI INWARD STOCK AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP (GLOBAL)
Source: ChartsBin (2011)
As shown in Chart 2, FDI has represented more than 20 per-
cent of Colombian GDP since 2002 with an average growth of 1 percent
between 2002 and 2007.38 Furthermore, recent studies show that com-
panies with FDI invest more in research and development, which in
turn allows them to pay better salaries.39
To reach these rates, Colombia has implemented a series of re-
forms to improve the investment environment. The reforms promoted
by former president A´lvaro Uribe Velez deserve special attention since
some established incentives for FDI.
To understand the causes, purposes, and expectations for cre-
ating incentives, it is important to briefly summarize the changing role
of FDI in Colombian economic history. After concluding said summary
and performing a comparative analysis of instruments for legal stabil-
36 See infra Chart 1.
37 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 16, at x.
38 Mauricio Reina, Impacto de la Inversio´n Extranjera en Colombia, presented for
Fedesarrollo Centro de Investigacion Econ. y Social (Apr. 28, 2009), available at
http://www.probarranquilla.org/documento/Presentaci%C3%B3n%20Mauricio%20
Reina%20-%20Fedesarrollo.pdf.
39 Id.
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CHART 2. FDI INWARD STOCK AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP (COLOMBIA)
Source: ChartsBin (2011),
with information from UNCTAD World Investment Report (2011)
ity, I will present the LSCs, a key incentive for FDI in Colombia and
the purpose of this text. I will then conclude with an analysis of the
law that established them and its impact.
II. FDI IN COLOMBIA – 20TH CENTURY: FROM AN ISI
STRATEGY TO A MARKET ECONOMY
The industrialization process in Colombia took place at the be-
ginning of the 20th century, decades after it started in other Latin
American countries.40 Some argue that this industrialization process
is related to the major crisis of the 1930s, which also occurred in some
other economies of the region.41 In any case, the consensus is that lit-
tle attention was paid to foreign investment at that time and that de-
pendency theories42 increasingly influenced policies toward national
investment.
40 See generally Decsi Are´valo, Misiones Econo´micas Internacionales en Colombia
1930-1960, 14 HISTORIA CRI´TICA 7 (1997).
41 See Mauricio Villamizar & Juan Jose´ Echavarrı´a, El Proceso Colombiano de
Desindustrializacio´n 3 (Banco de Republica de Colombia, Borradores de Econ. No.
361, 2006).
42 Dependency theory refers to a series of theories supporting the idea that re-
sources flow from the “periphery” (least developed states) to the “core” (wealthy
states). It played a major role in discussions on development, industrialization and
economic growth. In the second half of the 20th century “[t]he Latin American
‘dependentistas’ produced a knowledge that criticized the Eurocentric assumptions
of the cepalistas, including the orthodox Marxist and the North American modern-
ization theories.” Ramon Grosfoguel, Developmentalism, Modernity, and Depen-
dency Theory in Latin America, 1 VIEWS FROM SOUTH 347, 347 (2000).
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From the end of World War II until the late 1980s, Colombia
adopted a protectionist development model43 based on an import sub-
stitution industrialization strategy (“ISI”). Under ISI, foreign invest-
ments should be restricted and replaced with domestic production.44
Its goal is to avoid dependency and to reach development through local
industry.45 As in many other countries, Colombia followed the develop-
ment ISI strategy promoted by the United Nations Economic Commis-
sion on Latin America and the Caribbean (“UNCLAC”) in the 1960s.46
Regional agreements also influenced national legislation. For
instance, the Comunidad Andina (“CAN”), a regional international or-
ganization created in 1969 by Colombia, Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador,47
released Decision 24 of 1971, which prohibited FDI to strategic sectors.
Decision 24 of 1971 was introduced through national legislation, that
strengthened protectionist regulation (e.g. Decreto Ley 444, 1967).48
Hence, foreign investments were allowed only for specific and limited
sectors. Legislation in other related topics have included intervention-
ist measures to restrict FDI flows.49
In 1987, CAN decisions 220 and 244 established a new regional
development strategy that relaxed foreign investment restrictions,
particularly in the industrial sector. This period right before the 1991
Constitution of Colombia, frequently known as transition, was charac-
terized by timid changes in the regulation that allowed foreign invest-
ments while maintaining rigid interventionist measures as well as
control over inflows.50 There was flexible regulation, but no incentives
for FDI.
43 Marı´a Claudia Uribe Pineda, Colombia: Polı´tica de IED, Comisio´n Econo´mica
para Ame´rica Latina y el Caribe – Ministerio de Comercio Exterior (2002), http://
www.eclac.org/ddpe/noticias/noticias/7/9067/Colombia.pdf.
44 See Werner Baer, Import Substitution and Industrialization in Latin America:
Experiences and Interpretations, 7 LATIN AM. RES. REV., No. 1, Spring, 1972, at 95,
95.
45 See Jinwoo Kwon, Import Substitution at the Regional Level: Application in the
United States 9 (Oct. 26, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Fed.
Reserve Bank of Atlanta), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/news/
conferences/10smallbusiness_kwon.pdf.
46 See Mario A. Gutterrez, Eonomic Growth in Latin America: The Role of Invest-
ments and Other Growth 14 (U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Latin Am. & the Caribbean,
Macroeconomı´a del Desarrollo Serie No. 36, June 2005).
47 Venezuela adhered to it in 1973 and was a member until 2006. Chile retired in
1976.
48 See L. 1900, agosto 19, 1990, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
49 See JANG-YUNG LEE, STERILIZING CAPITAL INFLOWS 6-7 (Int’l Monetary Fund,
Econ. Issues No. 7, 1997).
50 See LUIS JORGE GARAY, COLOMBIA: ESTRUCTURA INDUSTRIAL E INTERNACIONAL-
IZACIO´N 1967-1996  (2004).
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Most countries in the world had to make transcendental eco-
nomic reforms during the 1980s to integrate into the newborn global
economy as a consequence of the failure of previous development strat-
egies (e.g. ISI, aid, and credit).51 Latin America in particular did not
experience significant economic growth.52 In Colombia, low growth
was accompanied by high fiscal and external deficits. The World Bank
also pressured Colombia to make structural economic changes.53
In this context, ISI was inexorably seen as an obstacle of eco-
nomic development. Traditional protection strategies were proving to
be ineffective and Chile’s success was evidence that market-oriented
reforms were the panacea.
Consequently, Colombia began a gradual liberalization of com-
merce in 1985 that concluded with important tariff reductions in 1990
and 1991.54 The 1991 Constitution was the final and definitive turn in
the country’s development from protectionism to a small government.
In this sense, a series of profound reforms took place, with impact,
among others, in commerce, labor regulation, taxation, and in the in-
stitutional frame.55
With respect to commerce, trade tariffs were reduced on aver-
age between 10 percent and 27 percent from 1984 to 1998.56 Regarding
labor, it was clear that the purpose was to reduce unemployment from
the economic perspective because the Constitution gave special treat-
ment to social rights. Reforms were thus twofold: reduction of labor
51 See REINEL PULECIO, supra note 35, at 21.
52 The “lost decade” of the 1980s had a devastating impact in the region. With the
exception of Chile, the average growth was below 2%, which contrasts with the
average 5% between 1950 and 1980. See JOSE´ ANTONIO OCAMPO, UN FUTURO ECO-
NO´MICO PARA COLOMBIA 6 (2001).
53 “The decade of 1980 meant to Colombia a strong deceleration of growth and
high fiscal and external deficit (. . .) In April of 1989 the World Bank published the
study of the Colombian economy denominated ‘Commercial Policy Survey 1986-
1987’, in which it points out the necessity to make this structural change, which
was evaluated and defined by the government of the president Virgilio Barco (. . .)”
(own translation). A´LVARO ALBAN MORENO & JORGE ALBERTO RENDON VELEZ.
CRECIMENTO, DESAROLLO DEMOCRACIA EN COLOMBIA: LOS CONTRAPESOS DE UN
PROCESO INCOMPLETO 120 (2009); See, e.g., Support for Adjustment in Colombia,
THE WORLD BANK GROUP (2012), http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/
DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/EDB98EFC8A6C8286852567F5005D8378.
54 Eduardo A. Hadad et al., Efectos Regionales de una Mayor Liberacio´n
Comercial en Colombia 1 (Banco de la Republica – Sucursal Cartagena, Docu-
mentos de trabajo sobre Econ. Reg. No. 104, Aug. 2008), available at http://www.
banrep.gov.co/documentos/publicaciones/regional/documentos/DTSER-104.pdf.
55 See Ce´sar Gaviria Trujillo, Pro´logo, in UNA APERTURA HACIA EL FUTURO ix (Ru-
dolf Hommes et al. eds., 1994).
56 Hadad et al., supra note 54.
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costs and relaxation of the structure on one hand, and growth of the
non-salary costs as a proportion of the payroll on the other.57
Tax reforms were also encouraged and implemented with the
foreseeable intention of increasing collection, which declined in the
1980s, fairly called the lost decade.58 Different reforms of the same na-
ture were required during the 1990s for identical purposes because the
Constitution enlarged the demand for services.59
Colombia became progressively more dependent on interna-
tional trade and financial transactions as it entered the global econ-
omy, which made FDI crucial.60 This is why the reforms that
accompanied the 1991 Constitution included important modifications
to promote FDI. For example, the issuance of an exchange regime with
the passage of Ley 9 in 1991 liberalized determinant rights such as
return capital.
The regime included FDI principles (fair and equitable treat-
ment, universality, and automatic approval of investment), a guaran-
tee of stability of exchange rights,61 and full access to local credit.62
Colombia also became part of different treaties that provided protec-
tion to investments against political risk.63
Despite these efforts, liberalization of the economy injured the
local industry, the country’s competiveness, and formal employment.64
57 See Alan Gilbert, Globalization and Latin America: Understanding the Global
Links of Colombia’s Capital, in GLOBALIZATION AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT – AD-
VANCES IN SPATIAL SCIENCE 165, 170 (Harry W. Richardson & Chang-Hee Chris-
tine Bae, eds, 2005).
58 See Fabio Sa´nchez & Silvia Espinosa, Impuestos y Reformas Tributarias en Co-
lombia, 1980-2003 at 11 (CEDE – Uni. de los Andes, Documentos CEDE 2005-11,
Feb. 2005).
59 Francisco Azuero et al., Contratos de Estabilidad Jurı´dica en Colombia (CEJ):
¿Informacio´n Asime´trica, Inconsistencia Intertemporal o Captura de la Autoridad
Tributaria? 4 (Uni. de los Andes – Faculitad de Admin., Galeras de Admin. No. 31,
2011).
60 Rudolf Hommeset et al., Reformas Estructurales – Polı´tica de Inversio´n Ex-
tranjera, in UNA APERTURA HACIA EL FUTURO 70 (1994).
61 L. 9, enero 17, 1991, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] art. 15 (Colom.).
62 See Sebastia´n Nieto-Parro & Mauricio Olivera, Making Reform Happen in Co-
lombia: The Process of Regional Transfer Reform 3 (Fedesarrollo – Centro de In-
vest. Econ. y Social, Working Paper No. 57, Dec. 2011), available at http://
www.fedesarrollo.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/WP-No.-57-Making-reform-
happen-in-Colombia.pdf.
63 See MAURICIO REINA & SANDRA ZULUAGA, CTR. FOR HEMISPHERIC POLICY, THE
IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON LATIN AMERICA: THE CASE OF COLOMBIA 4 (2012),
available at https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Task_Force_
Papers/Reina-GlobalizationTF.pdf.
64 See Carlos Enrique London˜o Rendo´n, La Apertura Econo´mica en Colombia, 4
PENSAMIENTO HUMANISTA 41, 49 (1998).
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The internal armed conflict sparked by drug traffic65 and the global
financial crisis at the end of the decade also negatively impacted the
economy and FDI inflows.66 In an effort to increase FDI implementa-
tion, former president Andre´s Pastrana promoted Acto Legislativo 001
(1999) to reform the Constitution and subsequently issued Decreto
2080 (2000), a presidential decree with binding character.67 The first
Act eliminated the possibility of expropriation without compensation.
The second established a new regime for foreign investments and for
Colombians’ investments abroad.
The aforementioned reforms created economic growth and
propitiated the signature of investment treaties, but their social im-
pact did not meet expectations. Key indictors of development, such as
employment and wealth distribution, are still waiting for relevant im-
provements. Hence, investments in the 21st century are not only im-
portant, but necessary. Those circumstances are where incentives that
matter for this study appear.
III. FDI IN COLOMBIA – 21ST CENTURY: NECESSITY OF
INCENTIVES, CONTEXT FOR LEGAL STABILITY
CONTRACTS
In the context of investment, incentives are governmental mea-
sures from which foreign investors can benefit,68 “in order to en-
courage them to behave in a certain manner.”69 Even though the
65 Colombia has experienced an internal armed conflict for more than 40 years.
The situation began in the middle of the 20th century when socialist guerrillas,
influenced by Communist ideas and following the example of the Cuban Revolu-
tion, fought for a change in the distribution and use of the land. In the 1980s,
violence intensified due to the increasing power of drug cartels and of a dangerous
joint venture between the two “forces”. With time, as cartel and guerrilla leaders
have diminished, political ideas have evaporated and the structure of violence has
gotten complex. See Nazih Richani, The Political Economy of Violence: The War-
System In Colombia, 39 J. OF INTERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD AFF. 37, 37 (1997).
66 See Bruce Michael Bagley, Narcotra´fico, Violencia Polı´tica y Polı´tica Exterior de
Estados Unidos hacia Colombia en los Noventa, 49-50 COLOM. INTERNACIONAL 5,
24 (2000).
67 See Pres. Andre´s Pastrana, Address at the 13th Andean Presidential Council
(June 23, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/
press/speeches/pastrana23-6-01.htm).
68 See Jean-Yves P. Steyt, Comparative Foreign Direct Investment Law: Determi-
nants of the Legal Framework and the Level of Openness and Attractiveness of
Host Economies (May 2006) (unpublished LL.M. Graduate Research Papers, Cor-
nell University), available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lps_LLMGRP/1/.
69 United Nations Conference on Trade & Development, Geneva, Switz., Tax In-
centives and Foreign Direct Investment: A Global Survey, 11, UNCTAD/ITE/IPC/
Misc.3 (2000), available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteipcmisc3_en.pdf.
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literature and UNCTAD consider them complementary to other deter-
minants for investment like market size or access to raw materials,70
most emerging economies rely on incentives to compensate the areas
in which they are less competitive to attract FDI. In Colombia, former
president A´lvaro Uribe Velez (2002-2010) insisted on the necessity of
increasing foreign investment despite the internal armed conflict and
ever-changing tax legislation. That partially explains why his govern-
ment was a pioneer in the effective implementation of investment in-
centives in the country.
Still, there are three main causes for creating incentives for in-
vestment in Colombia: legal instability, a new global economic order
(with subsequent international financial institutions’ pressure and
competition for attracting FDI), and the negative consequences of a
newborn development model based on a market economy.
At least since the 1980s, the literature recognizes the impor-
tance of a stable legal and political structure for an investment envi-
ronment.71 Diverse studies have found that political volatility reduces
FDI inflows72 and that legal stability is crucial in an investment deci-
sion.73 The negative impact of an unstable legal framework in invest-
ment (especially tributary-related) can only be compared to internal
violence, which makes it one of the main deficiencies for FDI in
Colombia.74
70 See id. at 3. See generally Rafaelita M. Aldaba, FDI Investment Incentive Sys-
tem and FDI Inflows: The Philippine Experience 14 (Phil. Inst. for Dev. Studies,
Discussion Paper Ser. No. 2006-20, Nov. 2006), available at http://www.eastasia
forum.org/testing/eaber/sites/default/files/documents/PIDS_Aldaba_2006.pdf (dis-
cussing foreign investors’ use of tax credits on raw materials).
71 See William H. Davidson, The Location of Foreign Direct Investment Activity:
Country Characteristics and Experience Effects, 11 J. OF INT’L BUS. STUDIES, No. 9,
Autumn 1980, at 9.
72 See Bruno S. Frey & Friedrich Schneider, Economic and Political Determinants
of Foreign Direct Investment, 13 WORLD DEV. 161, 173 (1985); Zhen Quan Wang &
Nigel J. Swain, The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Transforming
Economies: Empirical Evidence from Hungary and China, 131 WELTWIRSTSCHAF-
TLICHES ARCHIV 359, 370 (1995).
73 Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Effective Legal Systems and Foreign Direct Invest-
ment: In Search of the Evidence, 49 INT’L & COMP. L. Q., No. 4, Oct. 2000, at 779,
779 (“There are well developed theoretical arguments why the effectiveness of le-
gal systems should be a determinant of FDI.”).
74 See Herna´n Felipe Trujillo Quintero, Decisiones de Inversio´n de las Empresas
Transnacionales: Un Caso para Colombia 11-12 (Aug. 2009) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with Consejo de Ciencia y Technologia del Estado de Guanajuato),
available at http://www.concyteg.gob.mx/formulario/MT/MT2009/MT6/SESION2/
MT62_HTRUJILLO_099.pdf; CONSEJO NACIONAL DE POL. ECON. Y SOCIAL, supra
note 8, at 1.
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The competition for FDI and pressure from the international
financial system have also urged the creation of incentives,75 which
are seen as a necessary tool to compete. According to a study by
Agarwal, “[t]he evidence on the influence of incentives on the inflow of
FDI is clearer than that on the influence of political instability.”76
Colombia competed with similar economies in the region while
simultaneously having to mitigate the adverse effects of liberalization,
such as low wages and unemployment.77 Incentives thus gained ac-
ceptance, especially considering the assertion that FDI is the most ef-
fective source of capital and new jobs.78
As clear as it might have been, policymakers must take into
account all available options when planning to implement an incentive
since there is no one-size-fits-all formula. In the late 1980s and during
the 1990s, developing countries implemented a variety of strategies to
attract FDI. Although subject to the specific needs of each economy,
reducing taxation and cutting import tariffs have been the main re-
sponses to globalization.79
With respect to security, insurance instruments quickly
adapted to the specific needs of countries and projects, to the point
that insurance is now almost a prerequisite for investing in certain
regions.80 The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (“MIGA”),
an entity member of the World Bank offering insurance to foreign in-
vestors against losses caused by “noncommercial risks,”81 is involved
in virtually all big investment projects worldwide and has more than
170 member States, including Colombia.82
75 See OMAN, supra note 7, at 3.
76 See Jamuna P. Agarwal, Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: A Survey,
116 WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV 739, 761 (1980).
77 See generally RICARDO ARIAS TRUJILLO, HISTORIA DE COLOMBIA CONTEMPORA´NEA
(1920-2010) at 181 (2011) (exploring the history of Colombia’s modernization
efforts).
78 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), FOREIGN DIRECT INVEST-
MENT FOR DEVELOPMENT - MAXIMISING BENEFITS, MINIMISING COSTS 122 (2002) (
“[T]he major impact of FDI on human capital appears to have occurred not so
much through the efforts of individual MNEs (multinational enterprises) as from
government policies designed to attract FDI via enhanced human capital.”).
79 See generally Eduardo Lora, Trends and Outcomes of Tax Reforms, in THE
STATE OF STATE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 185, 185 (Eduardo Lora ed., 2007).
80 See Hadiza Tijjani Mato, The Role of Stability and Renegotiation in Transna-
tional Petroleum Agreements, 5 J. POL. & L. 33, 34 (2012).
81 See Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency
(MIGA), Preamble (Apr. 12, 1988), available at http://www.miga.org/documents/
miga_convention_november_2010.pdf.).
82 See MIGA Members, WEB.WORLDBANK.ORG (Sept. 6, 2012), http://go.worldbank.
org/76NJ98JCM0 (providing an updated list of members and noting that, as of
May 2012, the MIGA had 176 member States).
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Among the incentives for FDI, the ones providing stabilization
(like LSCs) vary not only in shape, but also in purpose, object, condi-
tions, parties, and effects.83 In fact, plenty of instruments allowing in-
vestors to stabilize legislation are not part of a strategy to attract FDI,
but rather are risk-management mechanisms used by foreign inves-
tors mainly in the primary sector.84
In view of the latter, I will introduce the relationship between
investment and legal stability in the next section. Keeping in mind
that instability was directly related to Colombia’s low FDI flows, and
with the purpose of providing a spectrum in which to locate Law 963 of
2005, I will conclude with a comparative chart of similar legislation in
the region that sheds some light for the analysis in section 5.
IV. LEGAL STABILITY: LAW 963 OF 2005 IN THE
STABILIZATION SPECTRUM
Legal stability is almost a prerequisite for investment decisions
in long-term projects.85 That is why foreign investors seek countries
that minimize the risks associated with unpredictable changes in their
legislation. However, that risk is always a variable since it is part of
the sovereign right of a state to set up the rules that it considers ap-
propriate.86 Hence, although the threat is higher in undeveloped econ-
omies, legal stability is a shared concern for all countries intending to
attract FDI.
Foreign investors experienced the threat of political and legal
instability before the topic was an issue for states and even before FDI
was an accepted development tool.87 The matter was particularly im-
portant in the primary sector where these types of projects generally
require years to produce beneficial results.88 A wave of nationaliza-
tions of foreign projects in oil and mining during the 1960s and 1970s
83 See infra Table 2.
84 See Tijjani Mato, supra note 80, at 34 (describing private investors using stabi-
lization clauses in petroleum agreements).
85 See Davidson, supra note 71, at 1; see also Frey, supra note 72, at 161; Wang,
supra note 72, at 359; Perry-Kessaris, supra note 73, at 781-84.
86 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 531-32 (2005).
87 See generally Samuel K. B. Asante, International Law and Foreign Investment:
A Reappraisal, 37 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 588 (1988) (exploring the status of foreign
investments in light of ongoing political disputes).
88 See UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2012 OVERVIEW – TOWARDS A NEW
GENERATION OF INVESTMENT POLICIES 6 (2012), available at http://unctad.org/en/
PublicationsLibrary/wir2012overview_en.pdf.
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was the main reason to include a clause protecting investors from legal
reforms annulling or limiting their rights.89
The Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN
on business and human rights, John Ruggie, carried out a global study
on such provisions and found that they are currently “widespread
across industries and regions of the world.”90 “Stability clauses,” as
they are commonly known, address changes in the host country’s legis-
lation and attribute different effects to it. Ruggie’s report, submitted in
2008, identifies three types of stability clauses, which can also appear
in a “restricted version.” Table 1 summarizes findings on the most
common clauses.
TABLE 1. TYPES OF STABILIZATION CLAUSES
Full Freezing Clauses freeze both fiscal Limited Freezing Clauses freeze more
and non-fiscal law with respect to limited sets of legislative actions.
investment for the duration of the project. Exemptions are required.
Exemptions are required.
Full Economic Equilibrium Clauses Limited Economic Equilibrium
protect against the financial implications Clauses protect against financial
of all changes of law, by requiring implications of some limited set of changes
compensation or adjustments to the deal to of law or after specified costs are incurred.
compensate the investor when any changes They require compensation or adjustments
occur. to the deal to compensate the investor only
when the covered changes occur.
Full Hybrid Clauses protect against the Limited Hybrid Clauses protect against
financial implications of all changes of law, the financial implications of some limited
by requiring compensation or adjustments set of changes of law or after specified
to the deal, including exemptions from costs are incurred. They require
new laws, to compensate the investor compensation or adjustments to the deal,
when any changes occur. including exemptions from new laws, to
compensate an investor only when the
covered changes occur.
Source: Andrea Shemberg (2009)
In spite of the differences between them, stability clauses
clearly address a traditional concern for foreign investors after the
1960s: the threat that legal instability presents for their profits. Even
though said clauses are still used in a variety of agreements, develop-
89 ANDREA SHEMBERG, INT’L FIN. CORP., STABILIZATION CLAUSES AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 4 (2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/globalforum/4031
4647.pdf.
90 See INT’L FINANCE CORP., STABILIZATION CLAUSES AND HUMAN RIGHTS – A RE-
SEARCH PROJECT CONDUCTED FOR IFC AND THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL REPRESEN-
TATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS at vii (2009),
available at http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/9feb5b00488555eab8c4fa6a6515
bb18/Stabilization%2BPaper.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=9feb5b00488555e
ab8c4fa6a6515bb18.
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ing countries have found a stabilization mechanism to improve their
investment environment when competing for FDI.91
Chile was one of the first countries in the world to openly offer
stabilizing tax laws to virtually any foreign investor. Decreto 600,
which has been in force since 1974, is a binding presidential decree
that established a national regime for foreign investments that stabi-
lizes income tax for up to 10 years.92 This legislation separated the
country from others in the region,93 but efficiently attracted foreign
investments that had positive impacts on development and growth.94
Decreto 600 requires foreign investors, and any foreign capital
in general, to sign a contract with the State that authorizes the en-
trance of investments into the country.95 Investments that meet the
requirements (transnational money transfer for a project in Chile) are
entitled to include a provision stabilizing the income tax for up to 10
years.96 A committee, created by the same decreto and integrated by
ministers and the president of the Central Bank, ultimately decides
whether these requirements are met.97 The resulting agreement is
known as a Contrato de Estabilidad Tributaria (Contract for Tax Sta-
bility). Its committee creation process distinguishes it from other con-
tracts merely authorizing the investment and from the aforementioned
stability clauses.
The practice changed in the 1990s with the introduction of new
stabilizing instruments, despite Chile’s proven success at attracting
quality FDI during a period in which most countries of the region were
avoiding it.98 That is the case in Panama where stabilization of differ-
ent types of legislation was permitted without subjecting them to the
approval of a reviewing entity. For example, according to Panamanian
Ley 54 (1998), any foreign or non-foreign investment with $2 million
Panamanian Balboas99 (which is equivalent to US dollars)100 or more
has the right to stabilize national and municipal legislation in areas
91 See generally David A. Jodice, Sources of Change in Third World Regimes for
Foreign Direct Investment, 1968–1976, 34 INT’L ORG. 177, 177 (1980).
92 Decreto Ley 600, julio 13, 1974 [Presidential Decree] art. 7 (Chile).
93 See supra pp. 12-17 (noting that Chile retired from the CAN and left the import
substitution industrialization strategy behind two years later).
94 See Raphael Bergoeing et al., A Decade Lost And Found: Mexico and Chile in
the 1980s, 5 REV. OF ECON. DYNAMICS 166, 198 (2002) (finding that, compared to
Mexico, Chile experienced a faster recovery from the economic crises of the 1980s,
due to its reforms toward an open market and the attraction of FDI).
95 See Decreto Ley 600, supra note 92, art. 3.
96 Id. art. 7.
97 Id., arts. 3, 12; see also infra Table 3.
98 Bergoeing, supra note 94, at 1-2.
99 L. 54, julio 22, 1998, art. 16 (Pan.).
100 See L. 84, junio 28, 1904, art. 1 (Pan.).
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such as labor, tax, and customs.101 In this case, the benefit is also
granted for up to 10 years102 and does not require the signing of a
contract. Ecuador has implemented this model as well.103
It is important to mention that the Contracts for Tax Stability
were issued as a deep tax reform collection in Colombia in 1995. The
article allowing their subscription was included in the national Tax
Regime104 and was quite similar to Chilean legislation. However, it
was applied only during its five years in force.105 Additionally, there
are three main reasons not to include them in the incentive analysis or
to even consider them an incentive for FDI:
Context
As stated in section II, Colombia adopted a new development
model based on a market economy in the 1990s. This required a set of
reforms to mitigate the adverse effects of such a change and to in-
crease its capacity to compete in a global market.106 Ley 223 (1995)
was part of the body of legislation designed to increase collection
through changes in existing taxation and the introduction of new
taxes.107 With respect to investment, the concern was with improving
the legal base for national enterprises and making them more competi-
tive, rather than attracting FDI.
Purpose
Contrary to the 2005 LSCs, the contracts created in 1995 did
not have the purpose of incentivizing the entrance of FDIs, but of al-
lowing existing legal entities to secure the profitability of their enter-
prises by “postponing” the application of future reforms regardless of
the type of project or its life.
Experience
Although attributable to a restricted interpretation imposed by
the national tax authority,108 the National Tax and Customs Office
101 L. 54, julio 22, 1998, art. 10 (Pan.).
102 Id., art. 10, § 2.
103 In Ecuador, investors are automatically entitled to stabilization when they
register their investment in the Central Bank. However, the legislation also allows
the signature of contracts, but with the same content. See Decreto Ejecutivo 1525,
June 24, 1998, arts 19, 30 (Ecuador).
104 L. 223,  diciembre 22, 1995, Diario Oficial [D.O.] art 169 (Colom.).
105 See L. 633, diciembre 29, 2000, Diario Oficial [D.O] (Colom.).
106 See Trujillo, supra note 55, at ix-x.
107 See L. 223, diciembre 20, 1995, Diario Oficial [D.O.], art. 169 (Colom.).
108 According to the dominant interpretation applied by the national tax entity,
stabilization could only be granted for 1 year. Consejo de Estado, the highest judi-
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(DIAN), less than ten contracts were signed, most of which aim to pre-
vent the application of a tax on the movement of funds.109
It is thus evident that legal stabilization responds to multiple
needs, such as the threat from stabilization, the need to attract FDI,
the promotion of all types of investments, or even the intent to in-
crease collection. The evolution into instruments with diverse pur-
poses and effects is also apparent. Table 2 shows some of these
differences and Table 3 compares relevant legislation in the region.110
Table 4 illustrates fundamental differences in the two types of con-
tracts for stability in Colombia, and the reasons not to consider the
ones created in 1995 as FDI incentives.111
TABLE 2. LEGAL STABILITY FOR INVESTMENTS
Stabilization Stability Contracts Stabilization Laws
Clauses
Definition Clauses in private Agreements between a Laws that guarantee
contracts that state and an investor the stability of certain
address changes providing the legislation to
in legislation. stabilization of investments that
legislation, subject to comply with pre-
specific requirements. established requisites.
Parties Investor (generally Investor (generally No.
foreign) and state. foreign) and state.
Purpose To guarantee the To attract foreign To attract foreign
profitability of a investments and to investments and to
project (risk- promote investments in promote investments in
management). long-term projects. long-term projects.
Term Life of the project. Established by the Established in the law.
parties, subject to limits Generally not
imposed by the state. negotiable.
Dispute Generally, International investment National administrative
Resolution international arbitration, national proceedings,
investment conciliation, and conciliation, and
arbitration. arbitration. arbitration.
Source: Author
cial entity for public law, abolished said approach, perhaps too late. The text of the
decision provides a summary of the subject. See Sentencia de 24 de agosto del
2001, Exp. 11636, C.P. Dr. Germa´n Ayala Mantilla.
109 See supra note 105.
110 See infra Table 2, Table 3.
111 Infra Table 4.
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TABLE 3. LEGISLATION FOR LEGAL STABILITY IN THE REGION112
Chile Peru Panama´ Ecuador Venezuela
Legislation Decreto 600 Decreto Ley Ley 54 (1998) Ley 46 (1997) Decreto Ley
(1974) 662 (1991) 356 (1999)
Ley 27342 Decreto
(2000) Ejecutivo
1525 (1998)
Mechanism or Contract. Contract. Law. Law. Contract.
Instrument (Art. 3) (Art. 10, DL (Art. 6) (Art. 19, DE (Art. 17)
Granting the 662) 1525)
Stability
Contract.
(Art. 30, DE
1525)
Beneficiaries Foreign Foreign Foreign and Foreign and Foreign and
investments investments. national national national
and (Art. 10, DL investments. investments. investment.
investments 662) (Art. 1) (Art. 22, Ley (Art. 18)
from Chilean 46)
nationals
residing
abroad.
(Art. 3)
Minimum Not required. US$5 million. US$ 2 million. US$ 500,000. Not
Amount of US$50 million, US$10 (Art. 16) (Art. 23, Ley required.
Investment for million for 46)
investments in the primary
the primary sector.
sector. (Art. 2, Ley
(Art. 3) 27342)
Sector of the All. All. All. All. All.
Economy (Art. 3) (Art. 11, DL The law (Art. 22-27, (Art. 17)
662) provides a Ley 46)
wide list of
activities and
adds “any
approved by
the Committee”
(Art. 5)
Entity in Charge Special National Special entity, None National
of Applying the Committee, entity, attached to the stabilization entity,
Law integrated by depending on Ministry of is automatic. depending
Ministers and the sector in Commerce, but (Art. 19, Ley on the
the president which the integrated by 46) sector in
of the Central investment is representatives If the which the
Bank. made. of private investor investment
(Art. 3 and 12.) (Art. 43, DL entities, such decides to is made. It
757) as Commerce sign the must have
Chambers and contract, the the approval
Labor Unions. Ministry of of the
(Art. 14.) Commerce. national tax
(Art. 30, Ley agency and
46) Congress.
(Art. 17)
112 Some of cited states have more laws regulating foreign investment and
establishing benefits for its attraction, even related to legal stability. The legal
instruments chosen for this table are the ones that more specifically deal with the
topic. See infra Table 3.
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Object of Income tax. Income tax, National and Income tax. Export tax.
Stabilization (Art. 7) exchange local tax (Art. 24, Ley (Art. 17)
regime and legislation, 46)
the labor and
guarantee of customs.
equal (Art. 10)
treatment.
(Art. 10, DL
662)
Term 3 years. 10 years. 10 years. 10 years for 10 years.
For the (Art. 15, DL (Art. 10) reinvestments (Art. 17)
primary sector, 662) not directed
8 years that to increase
can be production.
extended to 12 20 years for
with new projects
authorization or
of the investments
Committee. to enlarge
(Art. 7) existing ones.
The Counsel
can authorize
an addition of
5 years to the
term,
depending on
the sector.
(Art. 24, Ley
46)
Dispute Not specific. International National International National
Resolution Administrative investment conciliation investment commercial
proceedings arbitration. and, arbitration. arbitration.
are available. (Art. 16, DL alternatively, (Art. 32, Ley (Art. 18)
662). arbitration. 46)
(Art. 20)
Source: Author
V. LEGAL STABILITY CONTRACTS: TO ATTRACT NEW
INVESTMENTS OR TO ENLARGE EXISTING ONES
In the beginning of the 21st century, the Colombian govern-
ment knew that the country’s ever-changing tax legislation limited the
possibility of attracting foreign investments.113 Additionally, other
countries in the region had successfully mitigated those effects with
legislation allowing for stabilization.114
Former president A´lvaro Uribe Velez prioritized attracting FDI
from his first day in office and deemed it one of the three main policies
of his government.115 He named this policy “Confianza Inversionista”
(Investors’ Reliance), which he justified with the saying: “la inversio´n
113 Azuero, supra note 59, at 2.
114 See supra Table 3.
115 See V. Meija & Jose Manuel, Santos Cerca de la Independencia: Prea´mbulo a
la Desintegracio´n de la Unidad Nacional, 1 Revista Andina de Estudios Pol., No. 5,
Apr. 2011, at 5.
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TABLE 4. CONTRACTS FOR TAX STABILITY (1995) VS. LEGAL STABILITY
CONTRACTS (2005)
Ley 223 de 1995 Ley 963 de 2005
Contracts for Tax Stability Legal Stability Contracts
(Contratos de Estabilidad (Contratos de Estabilidad
Tributaria) Jurı´dica)
Context Deep tax reforms and internal Improve national security and
security problems. commercial relations with
other states, and proliferation
of treaties for the protection
and promotion of FDI.
Purpose To allow legal entities not to To attract new investments or
be subjected to new taxes or to enlarge existing ones.
interpretations established in
further reforms.
Beneficiaries All legal entities. Investments that meet two
requirements: certain amount
of money, payment of a prime.
Entity in National tax entity. Special Committee.
Charge of
Applying
the Law
Object of Income tax and to prevent the All national legislation, with
Stabilization application of new taxes. few exceptions.
Term of 10 years. Between 3 and 20 years.
Stabilization
Number of Less than 10. More than 60.
Signed
Contracts
Source: Author
fluye a donde hay confianza” (investments flow where there is
reliance).116
Open exchange legislation (Ley 9, 1991), a competitive foreign
investment regime (Decreto 2080, 2000), and a successful military
strategy117 were the basis for increasing investors’ reliance through
incentives. Given this, the government presented the project for the
116 See “Colombia Quiere Ser Lider Mundial en Confianza Inversionista,” Afirma
el Presidente Uribe, SECRETARI´A DE PRENSA – SP – Noticias (May 7, 2009), http://
web.presidencia.gov.co/sp/2009/mayo/07/16072009.html.
117 See Alejandro Santos, El an˜o que volvio´ la esperanza, REVISTA SEMANA (July
27, 2003), www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/el-ano-volvio-esperanza/59576-3; See
also Victories, but No Waterloo, THE ECONOMIST (July 15, 2004), www.economist.
com/node/2926049 (describing the Colombian army’s growing military successes
over the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia).
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promotion of “Investors’ Reliance,” and LSCs were introduced to Con-
gress in 2003.
The project provided stabilization for new investments and
compensation in case of non-compliance.118 Congress partially modi-
fied the text to allow both national and foreign investments. It also
amended the text to reaffirm its right to maintain the application of
the rules stipulated in the contract, leaving compensation as a last re-
sort, and not as a right of the state.119
It is important to note that Congress’ inclusion of national in-
vestments reaffirmed FDI’s fair and equitable treatment standard.120
It also motivated local investments to have a similar social impact and
capital as FDI.121 This in turn maintained the incentive appearance
that was vital to attracting FDI. It also maximized the Law’s possibili-
ties for increasing economic and social benefits in that it was not re-
stricted to FDI, but was also available to local investors. In a nutshell,
this resulted in more investments with high positive impact on
development.
After these modifications, the project became a law of the Re-
public (Ley 963) on July 8, 2005.122 The purpose of Ley 963 is to pro-
mote new investments and to enlarge existing ones.123 Some contend
that its ulterior intent is to stimulate national and foreign invest-
ments.124 This position is consistent with the problems identified
118 See Proyecto de Ley 15 de 2003, “Por la cual se instaura una Ley de Es-
tabilidad Jurı´dica para los inversionistas en Colombia [Ley de Estabilidad
Jurı´dica para inversionistas]”, julio 20 de 2003, available at http://congresovisible.
org/proyectos-de-ley/por-la-cual-se-instaura-una-ley-de-estabilidad-juridica-para-
los-inversionistas-en-colombia-ley-de-estabilidad-juridica-para-inversionistas/322
3/#tab=2.
119 According to specialized literature, renouncing to the right to modify the law
(with compensation) is less protective of the State’s sovereignty. See Christoph
Schreuer & Rudolf Dolzer, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 75-77
(2008) (finding that renouncing to the right to modify the law (with compensation)
is less protective of the State’s sovereignty).
120 See id. at 139-48 (Equitable treatment is a standard of protection according to
which foreign investors should not be treated in a discriminatory manner, with
respect to national investors. In this sense, it includes elements such as due pro-
cess, good faith and freedom from coercion.).
121 Within the requirements to benefit from the law, it establishes a minimum
amount of approximately 1.5 million dollars (significant amount of financial re-
sources) and a description of the project with its expected economic and social im-
pact (another difference between FDI and other type of investments), which
constituted the basis for approval or disproval. Additionally, long-terms of stabili-
zation guarantee permanency.
122 L. 963, julio 8, 2005, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], art. 1 (Colom.)
123 Id.
124 Castan˜o, supra note 1, at 70.
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above, as well as with the rationale of attracting FDI and local invest-
ments with similar characteristics.
With regards to Legal Stability Contracts, the law states:
“[T]he Nation guarantees to investors that subscribe it, that if
there is any adverse modification in certain rules specifically included
in the contract, whose stability was identified in it as determinant for
the investment, the right to keep the application of the rules during the
term of the contract.”125
LSCs thus provide investors with the right to keep the applica-
tion of any rule determinant for their investment126 on the condition
that they comply with two prerequisite conditions. First, the invest-
ment has to be more than 5000 Colombian Minimum Monthly Legal
Wages,127 which is equivalent to approximately USD $1.5 million.128
Second, the investor has to pay the government a premium equivalent
to 1 percent of the investment made every year or 0.5 percent in the
unproductive phases of the investment.129
An investor meeting these requirements then has to present a
submission to the Comite´ de Estabilidad Jurı´dica (Committee of Legal
Stability),130 which was specially created by the law and is composed
of ministers and national authorities responsible for economic af-
fairs.131 Within the next four months, the minister in charge of the
sector in which the investment is going to be made must sign the con-
tract or provide reasons not to approve the application.132
In making this decision, the minister and the Committee must
follow general criteria established in the instruments that created the
law.133 Most of these instruments do not establish clear criteria,134
which gives the Committee wide negotiation power to guarantee – if
125 L. 963, julio 8, 2005, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] art. 1 (Colom.)
126 Excluded legislation: labor, emergency tax regulation, indirect taxes (regional),
prudential regulation of the financial sector and public services tariff regime. See
id., art. 11.
127 L. 1111, diciembre 27, 2006, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], art. 51 (Colom.) (replacing
the wages standard with a fixed value that can be actualized periodically).
128 See MINISTERIO DE COMERCIO, INDUSTRIA Y TURISMO, supra note 3, at §1.1.
129 See L. 963, julio 8, 2005, Diario Oficial [D.O.] art. 5 (Colom.).
130 Id., art. 4 (b).
131 Id.
132 See id., art. 4(f).
133 Some of these documents are Plan Nacional de Desarrollo (a national develop-
ment program for each presidential period), documentos CONPES (released by the
highest State organ for the coordination of the economy of the country) and the
law. See CONSEJO NACIONAL DE POL. ECON. Y SOCIAL, supra note 8, at 1-2.
134 See CONSEJO NACIONAL DE POL. ECON. Y SOCIAL, supra note 8, at 3 (establish-
ing that economic and social impacts were an important criterion for approving a
submission, but did not mention how decisive these criterion would be).
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applied correctly – an increase in investments and in their social
impact.
Even though the Committee had the power to decide whether
social commitments were binding obligations or not, obligations in
LSCs were limited to the investment before the first contract was
signed.135 This ruling providing that LSCs are only binding in capital-
related aspects was subsequently further reaffirmed.136
The law was also the subject of constitutionality exams. The
Colombian Constitutional Court considered the new law to be adjusted
to the Constitution in cases concerning equality before the law,137 sep-
aration of powers,138 conflicts regarding the application of the law, and
dispute resolution.139
Despite these successes in court, the criteria to approve sub-
missions have become more and more specific. For instance, the Com-
mittee prohibited the stabilization of certain taxes and deductions in
2009. It also established that only quantifiable obligations, both social
and financial, were to be analyzed in submissions.140 The Committee
and other national economic authorities have introduced a variety of
criteria since the law entered into force, mainly to prevent the signa-
ture of disproportional LSCs.141
135 See Azuero, supra note 59, at 13; Juliana Castan˜o & Paola Galeano, Los Con-
tratos de Estabilidad Jurı´dica en Colombia: ¿Una Verdadera Herramienta Para a
Proteccio´n de los Intereses del Inversionista Extranjero y Del Estado Colombiano?,
2 EAFIT J. INT’L L. 68, 89 (2011), available at http://www.eafit.edu.co/revistas/ejil/
Documents/ejil-jan-jun-2011/Los-Contratos-de-Estabilidad-Juridica-en-Colombia.
pdf.
136 L. 14, octubre 30, 2009, Comite´ de Estabilidad Jurı´dica.
137 See generally Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], marzo 29,
2006, Sentencia C-242, Gaceta de la Corte Constitutcional art. 12 (Colom.).
138 See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 2006, Sentencia C-320,
Gaceta de la Corte Constitutcional at preamble (Colom.).
139 See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Noviembre 22, 2006,
Sentencia C-961, Gaceta de la Corte Constitutcional (Colom.) (reaffirming that
LSCs are governed by Colombian law).
140 See L.13, septiembre 25, 2009, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.] § IV
(Colom.).
141 Interview with anonymous consultant, Comm. of Legal Stability, (Feb. 2012).
An expert consultant for the Committee who required anonymity, believes that it
is necessary to have objective criteria to empower the Committee with the capacity
to deny LSCs to projects that do not need it or that may not have a significant
impact in development. He stresses the importance of applying the law specifically
for what it was created: to attract investments that would not otherwise be exe-
cuted. With vague criteria, he insists, the Committee would have to keep signing
LSCs to most submissions, with direct negative effects on collection and commerce
(equality).
2013] LEGAL STABILITY CONTRACTS IN COLOMBIA 263
On the other hand, some modifications were actually issued
without the appropriate publicity. For example, Cesar Cermen˜o, Man-
ager of the Litigation & Dispute Resolution Department of Deloitte in
Colombia, stresses the negative impact of the legal instrument Acta
No. 11 (September 7, 2009). Acta No. 11, which had binding effects on
the Committee, established, inter alia, that only investments that re-
present more than 75 percent of the fixed assets of the investing enter-
prise were to benefit from a 20-year stabilization regardless of other
criteria or the types of projects. Cermen˜o insists that the lack of public-
ity prevented the execution of important projects with proven positive
social impact for which the term of stabilization was determinant.142
The instrument has now been adjusted notwithstanding the
discussions on criteria. Ley 963, for example, recently experienced two
important modifications.143 The National Development Program for
2010-2014,144 which is a type of legislation that is issued in every pres-
idential period,145 introduced these modifications. The first change
was in the criteria for new investments, which originally included all
projects starting operations after the law entered into force.146 Since
reform became binding, new investments refer only to projects starting
operations after the contract is subscribed.147
This legal instrument also eliminated the static 0.5 percent
and 1 percent prime standard by giving the Ministry of Finance and
Public Debt (Hacienda y Cre´dito Pu´blico) the authority to issue a new
methodology defining their amount, in view of the risk for the nation
and taking into account each specific submission.148
These modifications were made through a law with temporary
effects that left the possibility of permanent incorporation uncertain.
142 One of Cermen˜o’s clients was a national energy corporation with operations in
different cities and with high fixed assets. One of its projects consisted in the in-
stallation of street lights in some of the poorest populations of the north coast. The
submission, presented prior to the issuance of the cited Acta, was approved with
one quarter of the stabilization term required, even though it complied with all
other criteria and proved to have a direct positive impact in society and in the
development of the region See Interview with Ce´sar Cermen˜o, Manager of Litiga-
tion & Dispute Resolution Dept., Deloitte - Colom. (Nov. 24, 2011).
143 See L. 1111, art. 21 (indirectly reforming Ley 963 by modifing the Tax Re-
gime’s measurement from the traditional minimum monthly legal wages to a new
concept known as unit of tributary value (UVT, for the Spanish Unidad de Valor
Tributario).
144 See L. 1450, junio 16, 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] art. 1 (Colom.).
145 See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 339-342; see also L. 152,
julio 15, 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] arts. 13, 14, 25 (Colom.).
146 See L. 963, julio 8, 2005, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] art. 3 (Colom.).
147 See L. 1450, art. 49.
148 Id., art. 48.
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Their orientation, however, makes it reasonable to infer that Juan Ma-
nuel Santos’ current government is not in favor of incentives. Whether
a consequence of a turn in the policies toward FDI or a change in the
Committee’s agenda and methodology for analyzing submissions, the
truth is that the number of approved contracts has decreased and sub-
missions have been suppressed since the end of 2009.149 Up to May,
2011, 160 submissions were pending and some accusations for uneven
competition practices were presented to the competent authorities.150
The impact of the introduced reforms is not conclusive how-
ever, as only one contract was signed in 2011. Additionally, the repri-
sal of submissions, some of which have been pending for more than one
year, shows the Committee’s inefficiency and how reprisal deteriorates
the investment environment.
In light of the above, the following analysis will emphasize the
Committee’s activity in particular. The intent of my analysis is to iden-
tify explanations to possible flaws of the law or its application.
VI. IMPACT ANALYSIS: HAVE LSCS MET EXPECTATIONS?
PROS AND CONS OF THE LAW AND ITS APPLICATION
I analyzed the 64 Legal Stability Contracts that were in force
at the end of 2010. The first was EJ-01 of 2006, which was subscribed
between the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Tourism, and the
corporation Alpina Productos Alimenticios S.A. on January 24, 2006.
The last studied LSC was EJ-16 of 2010, which was subscribed be-
tween the Ministry of Information Technologies and Communication,
and the corporation Telmex Colombia S.A. on September 15, 2010. Ac-
cording to the last report published by the government, two additional
contracts were signed at the end of 2010, and one contract was signed
per year in 2011 and 2012.151
1. General Data
Since Law 963 of 2005 entered into force, an average of 25
LSCs have been signed each year, although the majority were sub-
scribed in the 2008-2010 period.152 With respect to stabilization terms,
the most common period (65 percent) was 20 years. Only approxi-
149 See O Todos en la Cama. . ., DINERO.COM (May 11, 2011), http://www.dinero.
com/edicion-impresa/negocios/articulo/o-todos-cama. . ./118985.
150 Id.
151 See Contratos de Estabilidad Jurı´dica-Firmados. Resumen de Contratos de Es-
tabilidad Jurı´dica Firmados, MINISTERIO DE COMERCIO, INDUSTRIA Y TURISMO
(2013) https://www.mincomercio.gov.co/minindustria/publicaciones.php?id=17145
These four agreements were only included in the statistics concerning contracts
per year.
152 See infra Figure 1.
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mately 3 percent of analyzed LSCs had stabilization terms of less than
10 years.153
Investments were generally considerably larger than the mini-
mums required by law. Only 12 percent of the studied contracts had
amounts close to the minimum.154 Contrary to press critiques that
contend that the primary sector benefited most under the Law, the
only relevant pattern with respect to economic activity is manufactur-
ing and tourism (31.6 percent of analyzed LSCs).155 Only 9 percent of
investments were for the primary sector.156
2. Efficacy to Fulfill its Purposes
As explained earlier, the particular context in which LSCs and
most incentives for FDI in Colombia were implemented was due to the
need for fresh financial resources and significant employment genera-
tion.157 Since those constitute the ulterior purposes of the Law, I chose
to analyze the Law’s efficacy to meet its own expectations in those
matters.
a. Attraction of Investments
There are two sets of findings with respect to attracting invest-
ments. The first concerns the direct role of the Law in increasing in-
vestments and the second looks at its contribution to an investment
environment (investors’ reliance).
There is evidence that the Law has had a successful impact on
investments. As represented in Figure 2 (stability terms), most ana-
lyzed LSCs (79 percent) establish long terms of stability of 15 years or
more.158 This shows that Colombia has an advantage in competing for
FDI since similar legislation in Latin America only allows stabilization
for up to 10 years.159 This is bolstered by the fact that these projects
are planned for an extensive period and are thus more likely to rein-
vest. It is reasonable to infer that some investors have chosen Colom-
bia instead of similar destinations considering these comparative
advantages of the Law.
Additionally, more than half of the analyzed LSCs are for in-
vestments above COP $50.000 million, which is around 10 times the
minimum required by law.160 Statistics on the number of LSCs with
153 See infra Figure 2.
154 See infra Figure 3.
155 See infra Figure 4.
156 See id.
157 See supra pp. 255-60.
158 See infra Figure 2.
159 Id.
160 See infra Figure 3.
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foreign and domestic investments are not included given that there is
no conclusive data on the participation of foreign capital in the projects
entitled to stabilization. There is no available official record of the
number of LSCs in which foreign investors participated and the con-
tracts do not provide decisive information on the owners of the assets
of the companies. An inference based on the information included in
the contracts would not be precise enough considering that most for-
eign investors either merge or acquire Colombian companies in private
contracts. In any case, it is consistent with the purpose of this text not
to distinguish the two situations since, as expressed above, local in-
vestments that benefit from LSCs have FDI characteristics and com-
ply with the purposes of incentivizing FDI in that they attract
investments with high positive social impact.
b. Contribution to an Investment Environment
I identified two deficiencies in the application of the Law that
could harm the incentives’ attractiveness and eventually the country’s
investment environment: inexplicable delays in the approval and evi-
dence that the Committee lacks both cautiousness and general criteria
to guarantee equality.
With respect to the former, the most alarming finding is that
59 percent of the analyzed LSCs spent more than six months in the
approval process.161 Considering the Law stipulates that submissions
must be answered within four months of presentation, this clearly
damages the country’s image as an investment destination.162
Nonetheless, it is also true that most of the submissions that
took more than a year to be approved are long-term LSCs and there-
fore are presumably more complex projects.163 Generally, the longer
the stability, the longer the time to approve the submission.164 Inves-
tors may have some responsibility in this. Submissions have increas-
ingly addressed all types of legislation and investors have sent
extensive folders with complex information that have increased the
amount of work for the Committee during the time the law has been in
force.165 The Committee thus sometimes has to consult experts in dif-
ferent areas, which demands more time than the four months stipu-
lated by law.
With respect to the destination, only projects related to culture
and health evidence a significantly shorter time for approval, though
161 See infra Figure 5.
162 See id.
163 See infra Figure 6.
164 Id.
165 Interview with an expert consultant for the Committee (Feb. 2012).
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this is not a conclusive finding in the sense that projects in the men-
tioned areas are also fewer.166
Finally, even though there is no connection between the
amount of capital invested and the time the Committee took to ap-
prove the application, it is at least curious that higher amounts are
equivalent to shorter terms for approval.167
Regarding the Committee’s lack of caution, it is unclear why it
signed LSCs with investments that were already executed at the mo-
ment of the signature. It is true that the Law is applicable to invest-
ments made after its entry into force, but the object of each LSC is to
execute new investments, whether in new projects or in existing ones,
but new executions nonetheless. Guaranteeing stability to already exe-
cuted investments is like an empty glass of water: the investment was
going to be executed with or without the LSC. The State is still provid-
ing benefits that imply a detriment in collection.
Now, although only 6 percent of the analyzed contracts concern
executed investments,168 it suggests that the Committee either did not
notice or did not apply the law in accordance with its purposes. The
lack of general criteria for an objective analysis of submissions is ap-
parent in the results of the study: there is absolutely no clear connec-
tion between the amount invested and the years of stability
granted.169
c. Employment Generation and Social Commitments
Although the main purpose of the Law is to attract investment,
employment generation requirements were thought to increase the
positive social impact of investments, both local and foreign.170 It was
included in the Committee’s own criteria to approve submissions,171 in
the law,172 and in the technical173 and legal174 instruments that devel-
oped it.
Yet, immediate changes left the cited texts without any binding
character. Following technical recommendations for allowing the Com-
mittee to decide whether the social commitments had a binding char-
166 See infra Figure 7.
167 See infra Figure 8.
168 See infra Figure 9.
169 See infra Figure 10.
170 See CONSEJO NACIONAL DE POL. ECON. Y SOCIAL, supra note 8, at 1.
171 See Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo, Res. 01, ¶ 7 (2010).
172 See L. 963, julio 8, 2005, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] art. 4(a) (Colom.).
173 See CONSEJO NACIONAL DE POL. ECON. Y SOCIAL, supra note 8, at 1.
174 See Decreto 2950, Agosto 29, 2005,  arts. 3(h), 8(h) (Colom.).
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acter in each case,175 the president issued a decree eliminating the
exigency of including social obligations, such as generating employ-
ment.176 The result: obligations only for investment commitments.
This dramatic change not only reduced the Committee’s negoti-
ation capacity, but also eliminated an important mode of increasing
investments’ social impact. Therefore, 31 percent of studied LSCs do
not have commitments in employment generation177 and the existing
ones are not considered binding obligations. Therefore, not complying
with the LSCs does not entail contractual responsibility.
One could contend that, since none of the direct competitors
(namely, Latin American countries) included such obligations in their
legislation, it was reasonable to eliminate them to retain attractive-
ness for FDI. However, it is also true that none of the direct competi-
tors allowed stabilization for 20 years, which is evidently more
beneficial for investors. Additionally, the content and extent of social
commitments was part of the negotiation power attributed to the Com-
mittee for it to use on a case-by-case basis to maximize the positive
impact of investments in Colombia’s development. The elimination of
this requirement and the inclusion of new non-negotiable and capital-
related pre-requisites prevented the execution of projects with proven
incidence in the wealth of communities and development, in
general.178
3. The Law’s Main Problems and Its Causes
It is important to stress that the results of my analysis provide
evidence of deficiencies in Law 963 of 2005. Even though most are at-
tributable to the Committee’s misapplication of the Law, earlier re-
forms left no option for the establishment of social commitments as
binding obligations. The latter clearly reduces eventual benefits for
the State and increases its aptitude to attract FDI.
It is thus fair to conclude that Law 963 experienced earlier re-
forms, before it was applied, that oriented it to the attraction of capital
in detriment of other interests. The following table summarizes key
issues.
175 CONSEJO NACIONAL DE POL. ECON. Y SOCIAL, MODIFICACIO´N ACLARATORIA DEL
DOCUMENTO CONPES 3366 “CONSIDERACIONES TE´CNICAS PARA LA EVALUACIO´N DE
SOLICITUDES DE CELEBRACIO´N DE CONTRATOS DE ESTABILIDAD JURI´DICA” 2 (Docu-
mento Conpes, No. 3406, 2005).
176 See L. 133, enero 23, 2006, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] art. 1 (Colom.) (repealing
article 8 of Decreto 2950 de 2005).
177 See infra Figure 10.
178 See Interview with Ce´sar Cermen˜o, supra note 142.
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TABLE 4. LAW 963 OF 2005’S MAIN PROBLEMS AND THEIR CAUSES
Cause Problem Result
Employment and social concerns
1 Deficient application of the Committee’s lack of clarity Long-term stabilization for
Law. on the applied criteria. low investments.
2 Elimination of binding No employment generation LSCs for investments with
character for social obligations. less positive social impact.
commitments.179
3 New non-negotiable and Impossible to sign LSCs Fewer LSCs with high
capital-related for projects with high positive social impact.
requirements.180 positive impact in
development.
Approval
4 Committee’s inefficiency. Average time for approval 59 percent of analyzed
exceeds what the Law LSCs spent more than six
contemplates. months in the approval
process. More than 160
repressed submissions.
Projects
5 Applying the Law without Committee’s self-limitation LSCs for investments that
considering its purposes. of its negotiation capacity. were already executed at
the moment of the
signature.
VII. CONCLUSION
Colombia began the 21st century with major challenges in both
economic and social aspects. The competition for the attraction of For-
eign Direct Investment, as uneven as it is, required legal instruments
specifically created to stimulate it. At the same time, the consequences
of a complex and prolonged internal armed conflict in society, and of
unstable tax legislation in business, urged for an increase in invest-
ments with a positive social impact.
In this context, LSCs appeared as a competitive tool to attract
FDI and to increase the benefits of national investments. The results
of my analysis suggest that the law that established them successfully
met the expectations of increasing investments. I also found evidence
that some LSCs concern investments that might have been executed
without the incentive. Nevertheless, from the investment commit-
ments established in the studied contracts it is reasonable to conclude
that the law was appropriate.
Still, as promising as it might seem, it is the only remarkable
result of my research. According to the findings exposed in the previ-
ous section, there are two preoccupant conclusions. The first is that
179 See L. 133, art. 1.
180 See Comite´ de Estabilidad Jurı´dica, Acta 11 (2009); Interview with Ce´sar
Cermen˜o supra note 142.
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the Committee has been inefficient in the application of the law, which
could explain the ascending number of applications repressed and of
the related administrative and judicial actions. The other depressing
result is that early reforms have denaturalized the incentive, limiting
the possibilities to increase its impact in development.
Initiatives with a positive social impact are essential for Co-
lombia today. According to UNCLAC, 45.5 percent of the Colombian
population was poor and 16.5 percent of the population was extremely
poor in 2009.181 These rates contrast with the country’s consistent
growth and with its renewed image as an investment destination. In
the period between 2007-2010 the country ascended 40 positions in the
world business environment ranking, reaching position 39, which
means that it is the third most business-friendly country in Latin
America, the first in reforms for FDI, and the first in the region (fifth
in the world) that offers guarantees to foreign investors.182
Along this train of thought, it is fairly reasonable to question
the suitability of the reforms, since they have inclined the balance to-
ward financial resources to the detriment of development objectives.
The government has had the opportunity to reactivate employment
generation obligations and, instead, has imposed new capital-related
rules and requirements, some of which even limit the normative spec-
trum to stabilize. The findings presented above suggest that this is not
a step forward in the attraction of the desired investments.
If the government is pretending to make further modifications,
it should be for increasing the social impact: economic growth is stable
and investment confidence is at its highest level. Then, if Colombia is
finally an investment destination with investors’ reliance, it should
stop focusing on the capital and start focusing on society.
181 Colombia Avanza en ODM, Pero Persisten Grandes Brechas Regionales, NOTAS
DE LA CEPAL, http://www.eclac.cl/notas/65/Subsedes_Colombia.html (last visited
Mar. 4, 2013).
182 See WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 156 (2011).
2013] LEGAL STABILITY CONTRACTS IN COLOMBIA 271
FIGURES
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FIGURE 3: Investments per LSC
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FIGURE 5: Time for Approval
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FIGURE 6: Approval vs. Stability
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FIGURE 7: Approval vs. Ministry
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FIGURE 8: Approval vs. Investment
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FIGURE 9: Term to Execute Investments
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FIGURE 10: Stability vs. Investment
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FIGURE 11: Stability vs. Direct Employment
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